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Promoting and Regulating Generic Medicines: Brazil in 
Comparative Perspective 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Generic drug substitution may constitute a core instrument of countries’ 
National Pharmaceutical Policies, a way to reduce the price of drugs while expanding 
access to health care. Despite the potential importance of policy in this area and 
observed differences in national practices, scholars embarking on comparative 
analysis lack a roadmap of which dimensions of generic drug policy to assess and 
compare. We consider countries’ rules and regulations across four dimensions: (1) the 
demonstration of therapeutic equivalence, (2) pharmaceutical packaging and labelling, 
(3) drug prescription, and (4) drug substitution. We maintain that to be able to 
understand and compare national approaches toward generic drug promotion, it is 
crucial to carefully distinguish among these four dimensions. Furthermore, we suggest 
that analysis must also consider how the diverse interests of actors in public and 
private sectors shape the design and implementation of generic drugs policies. To 
illustrate both the dimensions of policy and the conflicts around generics policies, we 
focus on the case of Brazil.  
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Introduction 
 
To reduce the price of drugs, the World Health Organization (WHO) has long 
promoted generic drug substitution as a component of countries’ National 
Pharmaceutical Policies (1). To that end, the WHO established the guidelines by 
which one product is interchangeable with another (2), that is, the technical criteria to 
define when one pharmaceutical product can be exchanged for another, as well as the 
policy mix that could lead to a higher rate of generic drug use.  
We know a great deal about the policy instruments and mechanisms countries 
can use to promote both the supply of and the demand for generic drug products (1, 3, 
4). Anecdotal evidence and casual observation suggests that there is significant 
variation in national pharmaceutical policies in this area (5, 6). One challenge for 
comparative analysis, however, is the lack of agreement on which dimensions of 
policy to analyze and compare. This paper innovates by proposing a taxonomy of 
generic drug substitution systems, which can be used in comparative analysis. To 
illustrate the utility of the taxonomy we apply it to the case of Brazil. 
To understand the diversity in national practices, we need to consider key 
questions regarding the promotion and regulation of generic medicines. How, for 
example, do generic drug products demonstrate that they are therapeutically 
equivalent to originator products? Are generic drug products allowed to display brand 
names? Should doctors prescribe using the generic name or are they permitted to use a 
brand name? Are pharmacists authorized to substitute an innovator product with a 
generic version? These questions can serve as dimensions that can be used for 
comparative analysis. In the remainder of this paper we explain the significance of 
each of these issues (equivalence, packaging/labelling, prescription, substitution), and 
we then illustrate these dimensions with observations from the case of Brazil.  
 
Dimensions of Analysis: Equivalence, Labelling, Prescription, Substitution 
 
Regulatory authorities set standards for which drugs need to be therapeutically 
equal to reference products. This is demonstrated with tests of bioavailability (BA) 
and bioequivalence (BE). BA measures the extent to which a drug is absorbed into the 
body and available to act upon the drug's intended target (the site of action). BE is a 
regulatory concept that demonstrate that there is no significant differences on the rate 
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of two drugs over the course of a period of time, at the same dose and under the same 
conditions. That is, products that have the same BA are considered generic drug 
products, while products with different BA are considered similar drug products (or 
multisource drugs, according to the WHO terms). 
Demonstrating BE is essential for generic drugs. Small differences in 
bioavailability may alter the effects of the drug, therefore, it cannot be considered 
equivalent. The concept of BE is crucial when considering medicines with highly 
toxic ingredients or in a Narrow Therapeutic Range (NTR)
1
, i.e. small differences in 
the dose can have toxic effects in the body. National regulatory authorities have 
discretion to define how it will measure products' NTR but also which medicines will 
need to go through the BE tests.  
The regulatory question is essentially about determining which drugs are 
required to demonstrate BE and this is a decision that lies with each country. BE has 
arguably been associated with quality control (7) and it has often been difficult to 
define which products need to undergo it (8). 
 The second dimension for comparison regards countries’ rules on labelling 
and packaging of generic products. Use of the generic name or international non-
proprietary name (INN), usually a simplified version of the chemical name, can 
remove the obscurities that brand names create in identifying pharmaceutical 
substances. Not only may the INN be displayed on the pharmaceutical packaging, but 
font size and presentation will differ according to local regulations. For instance, 
some countries require the INN to be no less than 30-50% smaller than the font size of 
the brand name, some require that both be of equal size, while others still have banned 
the use of brand names altogether (1). Regulation of pharmaceutical packages and 
brands is very important in this sector, as marketing strategies represent an important 
element of the product cycle (9). As we shall discuss in more detail below, this is true 
not just for “innovator” firms but also for follow-on “generic” producers. 
Prescription and substitution are the third and fourth dimensions of our 
typology. The use of the generic name facilitates the prescription and dispensing of 
pharmaceuticals to patients, as well as the communication among health professionals 
and scientists (2). It also allows for easy “comparison shopping”, as there might be 
different suppliers of the same pharmaceutical product, that is, drug substitution. 
                                                 
1
 NRT drugs have less than a 2-fold difference between the minimum toxic concentration and 
minimum effective concentration in the blood. 
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Depending on national regulations, doctors might be required to prescribe by generic 
name; they may also include the brand name and recommend that the particular 
product be supplied or even forbidden the substitution for another drug. Other 
regulations might allow pharmacists to consult the patients to determine if they want 
the prescription filled with the brand name medicine or the generic medicine. 
This discussion of prescription and regulation is, of course, closely related to 
the previous discussion of labelling and packaging. After all, pharmaceutical firms 
invest heavily in distinguishing their brands, and they actively promote their brands 
among doctors and pharmacists. These promotional efforts can create incentives to 
prescribe or substitute one product for another. Even if health professionals have no 
doubts about the quality standards of generic medicines, doctors may be disinclined to 
prescribe them and pharmacists may be similarly disinclined to substitute them for 
reference products (10). 
 
 In the remainder of this paper we examine Brazilian policies toward generic 
substitution, through the lens of our taxonomy. The findings are based on empirical 
data collected between 2007 and 2015, including government documents in Brazil 
(e.g., policy memos, official speeches, etc.); more than four hundred newspaper 
articles; and scientific papers. These data are supplemented by 60 interviews with key 
informants such as lobbyists, regulators, and representatives of local and multinational 
pharmaceutical companies that have participated in the policy process. 
 
Generic substitution in Brazil 
 
Brazil is a case study that is crucial to understanding the regulation of interchangeable 
pharmaceutical products. Among Latin American countries, Brazil has the largest 
generic drug sector, which represents almost 28% of the pharmaceutical sales in the 
country. While Brazil has witnessed high levels of generic market penetration, the 
process has been accompanied by a number of conflicts and challenges. 
 
Equivalence 
 In 1999 the Ministry of Health took a decisive step to promote the substitution 
of a pharmaceutical product by its equivalent. With the enactment of the Generic 
Drug Act that established demonstration of bioequivalence (BE) as a condition for 
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market entry. The Generic Drug Act promoted a major reform in the pharmacological 
parameters for registering off-patent pharmaceutical products in Brazil.  The 
introduction of rules for therapeutic equivalence represented one of the most 
contentious elements of regulation affecting the country’s pharmaceutical sector, 
highlighting some of the political controversies surrounding drug substitution. Brazil 
introduced comparatively stringent requirements compared to other Latin American 
countries. A study conducted by PAHO concluded that of the eighty-six drugs 
analyzed in Latin American countries, fifty-one required demonstration of 
bioequivalence in Brazil. No other national regulatory authority examined by PAHO 
requested bioequivalence for so many drugs (11). Many local pharmaceutical firms 
claimed they would be unable to comply with these regulations given the high costs 
associated with them and the lack of expertise in Brazil necessary to conduct such 
complicated testing.  
 In Brazil, the regulatory authority took a decisive step in supporting and 
advocating for bioequivalence tests, but also promoted close collaboration with 
industrialists to help the national producers comply with the new requirements (12). 
For instance, the regulatory authority created a fast track approval process for firms 
prepared to register generic products and provided constant consultation and support 
to local firms to clarify and supervise changes to their regulatory departments. While 
in 2002, 27.3% of BE studies conducted in Brazil, by end of 2009, 87.6% were 
performed locally (13).   
 Local firms not only managed to adapt to the new requirements, but also 
became market leaders in the pharmaceutical sector (12). Local firms that adapted to 
the new regulations soon saw generic drugs as a valuable opportunity in terms of 
market share and improving industrial capability. Local pharmaceutical industries 
account for 88% of the domestic generic drugs market. Table 1, based on IMS Health 
data that includes both patent and off-patent products collected only from retail 
market (excludes government data, which are mostly essential medicines, drugs for 
AIDS treatment and other patent, high cost products), demonstrates the evolution in 
the growth of pharmaceutical sector and the current day status of local firms.  
 
## Table 1 here ## 
 
6 
 
 Thanks to the gains made in industrial capabilities brought about by the BE 
resolution and the increased relevance of local pharmaceutical producers, the local 
pharmaceutical sector became a national industrial policy priority. Pharmaceutical 
sector representatives assisted the Government in identifying bottlenecks to the 
sector’s expansion in Brazil (14). As Brazil is highly dependent on the import of key 
inputs for medicine production, e.g. raw materials and active pharmaceutical 
ingredients, this was identified as one of the priority areas for investments in the 
industrial policies (14, 15). The consensus among representatives of the 
pharmaceutical sector is that the generic drug regulations, first seen as a threat to their 
survival, have ultimately been instrumental in improving manufacturing plants and 
processes. 
 
Labelling  
The regulation of pharmaceutical products labeling is not a recent issue in 
Brazil. Three attempts to regulate packaging and non proprietary names raised heated 
political debates. First, in the early 1990s, a Congress Bill proposed to ban the use of 
brand names from all pharmaceutical products (Bill 2022/1991). At that time, there 
were two types of products in the market: the reference product (usually the innovator 
product) and the similar medicine (a copy of the reference product, but without 
equivalence tests), both commercialized under their respective brand names. Bill 
2022/1991, which was justified by the fact that 50 million people had limited access 
to medicines, proposed that all pharmaceutical products in Brazil should be 
commercialised using either the Brazilian or International Non-proprietary Name, 
BNN and INN, respectively (in the BNN is not available, doctors should use the 
BNN) . The rationale was that reducing the font size of the brand name would also 
reduce the cost of the product and facilitate interchangeability. The use of brand 
names, it was proposed, would be allowed only if they were presented in a smaller 
font size compared with the generic name; all public health service prescriptions 
should use the generic name.  
In 1993, and parallel to Congressional negotiations, the Ministry of Health 
promoted a second attempt to regulate these dimensions of generic drugs. The 
Ministry of Health sponsored Presidential Decree 793/1993, which required, among 
others, that the font size of brand names could not exceed one-third of the generic 
name and all drugs prescribed and procured by the National Health System should use 
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the generic name. The pharmaceutical industries and drug retailers promptly reacted 
through judicial battle, arguing these requirements would harm their businesses (16), 
and neither the Executive Decree or the Congress Bill  survived (17).  
It was only with the Generic Drug Act in 1999 that the discussions on INN and 
labeling progressed. The Law also stipulates that all generic drugs would provide only 
the INN, and that the packaging would include a yellow stripe with the letter "G", 
indicating that this product was interchangeable. In contrast, for the labeling of 
innovator products, the trademark would be displayed in a larger font size, and the 
(BNN) or INN would come right below, in a font size no less than 50% of the brand 
name. The packaging of similar drugs would have the same regulatory standards as 
the innovator products, but would not be interchangeable because, unlike generic 
products, they did not provide equivalence tests.  
 
Prescription and Substitution 
During the debates in Congress that led to the Generic Drug Act, the 
prescription rules for doctors were also highly controversial with the government and 
pharmaceutical industries, both national and multinational firms, disagreeing starkly 
on this component of the bill. The pharmaceutical industry demanded that generic 
drug substitution only be allowed by a doctor’s written request. However, the 
government did not agree to negotiate this aspect of the bill; thus, if doctors do not 
agree with generic substitution, they must indicate “substitution not allowed” on the 
prescription (18). While doctors at the National Health Service (SUS) are obligated to 
prescribe using the generic name, private physicians are not bound by this rule and 
thus can continue to prescribe by brand name.  
Effects and emerging challenges in Brazil 
 The prescription of generic medicines, i.e., by INN, is still low but has 
increased over time, representing 20.9% of the total prescriptions in 2006, compared 
to 11.8% in 2002 (19). Despite the growth of the generic drug market in Brazil, there 
is still low consumer awareness regarding drug substitution and slow acceptance by 
physicians (20). Studies suggest that there is confusion on how to differentiate 
between pharmaceutical products (innovator, similar and generic) and a lack of 
confidence in the quality of generic drugs (21) (22)  
 In terms of generic drug prescription, academic studies, market assessments 
and a number of newspaper articles point out that health professionals are still 
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resisting prescribing generic drugs (23, 24). For example, a survey conducted in 2006 
in eight Brazilian capitals assessed the opinion of 55 health professionals. Results 
showed that 44% of the health professionals surveyed believed that generic drugs 
were not as reliable as the original drugs, and that among those who trusted generic 
drugs, 17% did not prescribe them (25).  
 Public pharmaceutical assistance programmes could represent an important 
opportunity for generic medicine substitution. The Generic Drug Act (Law 
9787/1999) mandates that all public purchases and prescription of medicines should 
be done using the generic name. However, recent studies that assessed the availability 
of medicines in Brazil have demonstrated that, in the public sector, generic medicines 
are less available than similar drugs (26, 27). For the majority of pharmaceuticals 
assessed (71.4%), the availability of bioequivalent generic drugs was less than 10% 
(26). The authors suggest that public purchase of medicines has greatly privileged 
similar drugs. If correct, these numbers reveal an inconsistency between the 
pharmaceuticals that physicians prescribe in the Unified Health System (SUS) and the 
pharmaceuticals provided by public health facilities.  
 What might account for this inconsistency? The legislation that regulates the 
public procurement of medicines (and other goods and service contracts) determines 
that, if all technical requirements are met, the provider that offers the lowest price 
wins (Law 8666/1993). By contrast, generic drug legislation stipulates that in this case 
generic drugs should be given the priority (Law 9787/1999). Miranda et al. (2009) 
speculate that this inconsistency might be happening because: (a) generic drug 
producers are not interested in participating in public procurement, (b) better prices 
are offered by similar producers, or (c) there are difficulties following the legislation 
requirements.  
 
Recent reforms and challenges 
In 2014, as a response to the lack of confidence that many patients and health 
professionals have in generics and similar medicines, the government proposed a new 
regulation to clarify which pharmaceutical products are therapeutically equivalent. At 
the suggestion of the Ministry of Health, the National Regulatory Agency (ANVISA) 
proposed a new resolution to modify the packaging of pharmaceutical products
2
. The 
                                                 
2
 http://goo.gl/SwBa5r (accessed in August 26, 2014) 
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new resolution would allow pharmacists to substitute the reference product for a 
generic or a similar product.  
 To understand the challenges facing health policymakers in Brazil, keep in 
mind that most non-originator drugs have demonstrated bioequivalence. Most similar 
drugs are now BE; very few drugs that have yet to demonstrate this remain on the 
market. Yet most of these non-originator BE drugs continue to have brand names. 
These branded BE drugs, essentially like “branded generics” commercialized in retail 
markets in the US and UK, represent 47% of the pharmaceutical market (units), while 
formally “generic” drugs (i.e. BE and without a brand) represent 27% (Table 2). Yet 
substitution is only allowed for generics; similar drugs  cannot be exchanged once 
prescribed by a doctor. The government's intention was to adjust the packaging of 
interchangeable pharmaceutical products to include the symbol “EQ” – a visual label 
that would show that one product can be switched for another one.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
The Government argued that the 2014 EQ regulation would increase consumer 
options among products that are proven to be therapeutically equivalent, thereby 
reducing their price. The government maintains that this regulation was a response to 
2001 Resolutions 133 and 134, which established 2014 as the deadline for similar 
medicines to submit bioequivalent testing for agency approval, and a logical follow-
up to the earlier initiatives. Different from the discussion in the early 2000s that 
centered on quality and manufacturing processes, the EQ debate is only concerned 
with the labeling of pharmaceutical products.  
The announcement was made in January 2014 by the Minister of Health, 
Alexandre Padilha, one month before he resigned his position to campaign for elected 
office. This decision raised heated debates among pharmaceutical industry 
representatives. Technically, they argued, it was reasonable, as all products are the 
same, and have the same active ingredients and therapeutic responses (personal 
communication with the CEO of a Brazilian Pharmaceutical Industry in February 
2014). However, opposition to the EQ regulation is based on the following argument. 
The EQ label, it is argued would commodify reference products and similar 
medicines; both products still hold a brand-name with strong marketing strategies 
focused on prescribers. Therefore, pharmaceutical firms (local and multinationals) 
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that commercialize their products under brand names feared that they would be 
adversely affected, that the presence of EQ on the label would essentially send a 
message to ignore their brand markings. After a heated discussion with the 
pharmaceutical industries and a public consultancy held by ANVISA (Public 
Consultancy No 01/2014), Resolution 58/2014 was issued in October 2014, 
responding to the demands of the pharmaceutical industries. The policy outcome was 
that no EQ symbol would be added to labels, but rather that the leaflets are inserted 
inside of pharmaceutical packages would indicate if that product can be 
interchangeable. In other words, this information will not be available at the first 
sight.  
The debate over the EQ resolution is important for two reasons. The resolution 
intended to diminish the role of branding by emphasizing the equivalence of 
equivalent products. In doing so it would increase the scope of substitution and, it was 
expected, reduce the price of drugs. Although the idea behind the EQ proposal has a 
strong public health rationale, the structure of the pharmaceutical market in Brazil 
creates economic interests that were able to dilute the measure – and may yet subvert 
this policy instrument. The debate also illustrates how Brazil innovates in generic 
regulation, not just using traditional instruments of interchangeability (i.e., the INN) 
but with additional information in the package leaflet.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 We began this analysis by calling attention to the diversity of national generic 
drug regulation and its core policy instruments. We contribute to the literature by 
building new conceptual and empirical evidence on developing countries’ compliance 
with generic drug guidelines. To understand regional differences and regulatory 
choices, one must clarify what the incentives and public health interests of these 
instruments are and also what the country's institutional opportunities are to promote 
them. To demonstrate these relationships, we focused on the regulation of INN and 
prescription rules; bioequivalence and of pharmaceutical packaging in Brazil.  
 The case of Brazil demonstrates that regulation of INN and bioequivalence are 
not just technical concepts but highly contested political decisions. The Generic Drug 
Act in 1999, which introduced a new pharmaceutical product into the market, was an 
opportunity to foster the use of the INN in Brazil as a prescription rule and improve 
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the pharmacology requirements to register non-patent drugs. Though in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the debate revolved around the font size of the INN in relation to the 
brand name and the prescription rules and the therapeutically equivalence. This paper 
highlighted the strong conflicts of interest in applying these generic drug instruments.  
 Core lessons and implications from this case study are that: (a) The diverse 
interests of actors in the public and private sectors shape the design and 
implementation of the four core dimensions of national generic drug regulation. To 
design regulations that are effective and long lasting, it is crucial to understand the 
politics of drug substitution, i.e., their effects on public health, business preferences 
and strategies. (b) The task ahead is to think more clearly about the set of dimensions 
that influences national generic drug systems. This paper provides an initial step, 
which hopefully will attract the interest of scholars to evaluate our claims, refine, and 
apply them to other contexts.    
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Table 1. Ranking of pharmaceutical industries in Brazil (US$), 1999 and 2001-2011 
Industry 
YEAR 2011 Market  
Participation 
(%) 
99 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
EMS 29 12 6 5 5 5 3 2 1 1 1 1 
7,77 
Medley 32 19 12 7 6 7 6 4 4 4 2 2 
7,11 
Ache 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 
5,24 
Sanofi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 
4,63 
Eurofarma 28 25 21 19 16 9 8 6 6 6 5 5 
4,14 
Neoquimica * 48 48 39 36 39 38 36 31 20 8 6 
3,71 
Novartis 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 7 
3,54 
MSD * 9 7 8 10 16 17 7 8 8 9 8 
2,56 
Pfizer 7 3 3 3 3 3 5 6 7 7 7 9 
2,43 
Bayer  23 16 12 17 11 6 7 7 8 8 11 10 
2,16 
AstraZeneca 19 21 22 23 23 22 20 15 12 9 10 11 
2,03 
Teuto * 37 39 48 50 54 50 43 38 29 16 13 
1,89 
Source: (28 - with IMS Health data) and updated information from Sindusfarma (email). 
Obs. Bold cells refer to local pharmaceutical industries.  
(*) I was not able to get information for these years 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of pharmaceutical products by value (R$) and units in Brazil, 
Aug 2013–Jul 2014. 
 
Source: IMS Health, 2014 (information provided by email). 
 
Pharmaceutical product Value (R$) Units 
Similar drugs 44.48% 47.75% 
Similar drugs (without BE) 0.39% 0.57% 
Reference product 30.83% 23.81% 
Generic drug 24.29% 27.86% 
Total 62,132,559,369 3,010,750,992 
